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IN THE SYSTEM: FACILITATING
THE REUNIFICATION OF THE CHILD AND
THE PARENTS THROUGH RELIGION
I. INTRODUCTION

In 2004, a child named Ahmed was born to Muslim parents.' When
Ahmed was eighteen months old, he was removed from his home and
New Jersey's Department of Youth and Family Services ("Department")
took custody of him.2 Although the Department had a provision in its
administrative code that required the foster child to be "afforded the
opportunity to attend religious activities and services" in accordance
with his biological parents' faith, Ahmed was not allowed to attend
services at a mosque and neither the Department nor Ahmed's foster
parents abided by the religious dietary restrictions of the Muslim faith.3
Ultimately, the child's Muslim name was changed to a Christian name,
and his parents lost their parental rights in 2010, never regaining custody
of Ahmed.4
Ahmed's story illustrates the conflict between the religious beliefs
of a foster child and his foster parents that can occur in a foster home
after the child's placement. Under the First Amendment, the government
is restrained from establishing religion and placing an undue burden on
an individual's free exercise of religion.5 The court generally does not
play an active role in the relationship between the parents and the child
because the relationship occurs within private homes. 6 When children
1.
(Dec.
religion
2.
3.
4.

Aref Assaf, State Must Preserve the Faith Traditions of Foster Care Children, NJ.coM
13 2011, 5:41
PM), http://blog.nj.com/dr aref assa/20l1/09/troubledchildrens_
matters.html.
Id.
Id.
Id.
5. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6. See James. A. Cosby, Re-examining the Parent-Child-StateRelationship, 11 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 723, 724-25 (2002) (discussing the "iron-clad" rules that the Supreme Court has
developed to protect "traditional notions of parental autonomy"); Susan E. Lawrence, Substantive
Due Process and ParentalRights. From Meyer v. Nebraska to Troxel v. Granville, 8 J.L. & FAM.
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enter foster care, however, the child is under the temporary supervision
of the state, and consequently, the state plays a more active role in the
relationship between the parents and the child. While the child is under
state supervision, the state is granted discretion to determine if a
termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child.8
However, states are required to file a petition for the termination of
parental rights if the child has been in foster care for fifteen of the most
recent twenty-two months. 9 Generally, when the state terminates the
parents' rights, the child becomes eligible for adoption by either the
foster parents currently caring for the child or a different family seeking
to adopt a child.1° The state, however, may decide not to terminate
parental rights if the child is under the care of a relative, if the state can
show that filing a termination of parental rights petition is not in the best
STUD. 71, 88-95 (2006) (discussing the scope of the Supreme Court's involvement in the parentchild relationship).
7. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (discussing the state's role in
determination and continuation of foster care placement as well as the termination of parental
rights).
8. DEBRA RATnERMAN BAKER ET AL., MAKING SENSE OF THE ASFA REGULATIONS: A
ROADMAP FOR EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION 13 (Diane Boyd Rauber ed., 2001) [hereinafter
MAKING SENSE OF THE ASFA REGULATIONS]. There are various factors that go into determining

whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child. See id. For instance, in
some cases, before terminating parental rights, the court will consider kinship placement, and how
that may be an important factor in delaying or preventing termination. See Leah C. Schwartz, Case
Note, Blood as Best Interests: The Wyoming Supreme Court Expands AssociationalRights and the
Preferencefor Kinship Placement; In re JW, 226 P.3d 873 (Wyo. 2010), 11 WYO. L. REV. 549, 57076 (2011) (discussing Wyoming's statutory preference for kinship placement); see also In re JW,
226 P.3d 873, 881 (Wyo. 2010). In other cases, factors such as a parent's use of a controlled
substance is a statutory factor in determining if parental rights will be terminated. See Ian
Vandewalker, Note, Taking the Baby Before It's Born: Termination of the Parental Rights of
Women Who Use Illegal Drugs While Pregnant, 32 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 423, 426-27
(discussing how Florida's child welfare statutes allows parental drug use to be considered with
respect to a termination of parental rights).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (2006 & Supp. 2012); 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(i)(1)(i) (2012). Scholars
have criticized the requirement to file a petition for termination of parental rights when the child has
been in foster care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months because such a requirement
may seem unfair in certain circumstances, such as when a parent is incarcerated. See Deseriee
Kennedy, "The Good Mother": Mothering, Feminism, and Incarceration, 18 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 161, 171 (2012) (discussing the consequences of long-term incarceration as it relates
to child welfare); Steven Fleischer, Note, Termination of ParentalRights: An Additional Sentence
for IncarceratedParents, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 312, 327 (1998) (noting that some states, through
statutes, allow for parental rights to be terminated based upon the duration of a parent's
incarceration); Sarah Freeman, Note, Ensuring Effective Counselfor Parents:Extending Padilla to
Termination of ParentalRights Proceedings,42 HOFSTRA L. REv. 303, 318-23 (2013) (discussing
the insufficient legal protections for parents facing termination of parental rights). When termination
of parental rights is conditioned upon the duration of the parent's incarceration, the state is allowed
to sever the parent-child relationship, regardless of evidence that the incarcerated parent is
rehabilitated and able to play a positive role in his child's life. See Fleischer, supra, at 329.
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E)(i)-(iii).
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interests of the child, or if there is a judicial finding that the state did not
provide the parents and the child with sufficient services to enable the
family to be reunited. If a judicial finding is made, the child will
remain in the foster care system, and parents will retain their parental
rights until there is a judicial decision to terminate those rights, or until
there is a decision that it is in the best interests of the child to return to
his parents.1 2 In few states, after parental rights have been terminated, if
permanent placement has not been achieved, and if certain statutory
a petition can be filed requesting the reinstatement
criteria are met, then
3
of parental rights.'
Because parental rights are not terminated until the state child
protection agency initiates and concludes a judicial proceeding for the
termination of parental rights, parents should still be afforded a greater
level of protection when it comes to the religious activity of their
children while in foster care.14 The important role of religion in child
rearing is illustrated when courts sometimes consider the religious
upbringing of children in custody cases if the parties raise the issue.' 5
Scholars have noted that religion needs to be considered in the context of
foster care as well.' 6 Studies show that increased observance of religious

11. Id.
12. See id.
13. E.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(h)(3)(C)(i)(2) (West 2008) ("A child who has
not been adopted after the passage of at least three years from the date the court terminated parental
rights and for whom the court has determined that adoption is no longer the permanent plan may
petition the juvenile court to reinstate parental rights."); HAW. REV. STAT. § 587A-34(a) (2012) ("A
child who is subject to an active proceeding under this chapter, the child's guardian ad litem, the
child's attorney, if any, or the department, may file a motion to reinstate the terminated parental
rights of the child's parents in a proceeding under this chapter .. "); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
405/2-34(1) (West 2007 & Supp. 2013) ("A motion to reinstate parental rights may be filed only by
the Department of Children and Family Services regarding any minor who is presently a ward of the
court under Article II of this Act when all the conditions ... are met.").
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E)(i)-(iii); see also discussion infra Part 11.
15. See, e.g., In re Kurowski, 20 A.3d 306, 321 (N.H. 2011) (holding that a parent's religious
training of a child can only be restricted if substantial evidence shows that the child's welfare was
jeopardized); see also, e.g., Feldman v. Feldman, 874 A.2d 606, 607-08 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2005) (holding that, where a primary caretaker has sole authority over religious upbringing of
children, the secondary caretaker is not barred from exposing children to religious services or
holidays); S.E.L. v. J.W.W., 541 N.Y.S.2d 675, 676, 680 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1989) (holding that, while
a custodial parent has the right to determine a child's religious upbringing, a non-custodial parent
can be prohibited from instructing a child in a different religion when the religious practices cause
the child harm).
16. See, e.g., Terrence D. Hill et al., Religious Involvement and Attitudes Toward Parenting
Among Low-Income Urban Women, 29 J. FAM. ISSUES 882, 896-97 (2008) (noting that increased
religious participation is linked with better parenting); Jill Schreiber, Univ. of I11.
Urbana/Champaign, The Role of Religion in Foster Care (Nov. 2010), http://www.nacsw.org/
Publications/Proceedings2010/SchreiberJThe%2ORole.pdf.
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values creates better chances for improved outcomes for adolescents. 17
In fact, scholars support the idea that unified religious beliefs between
children and their parents can even create a more cohesive relationship
between parents and their children,
which may be something that is
18
desirable in a child welfare case.
Many state legislatures have either tried to pass or have passed
legislation to prevent courts from applying Sharia law or international
law to court decisions. 19 As of May 2011, more than half of the statesincluding Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Nebraska, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and
Wyoming-have either proposed or adopted bills or state constitutional
amendments to prevent state courts from using international law in court
decisions.2 ° Most recently, Kansas's legislators banned foreign law from
being used in judicial decisions in Kansas state courts. 21 Although courts
have not reached a decision on the merits of a challenge to a law banning
the use of Sharia law in state courts, at least one court has held that an
individual can have standing to sue over legislation banning Sharia law
because the law would expose Muslims to disfavored treatment.2 2 Laws
like this are a result of an Anti-Sharia Movement that has portrayed
Sharia law as a threat to American values and freedom. 23 This kind of
proposed legislation has the potential to limit the rights of Muslims in
America, including the rights of Muslim children in foster care.24 As the
hostility towards Sharia law and international law grows, the religious
beliefs of all foster children and their parents are put into jeopardy.2 '
17. See, e.g., Rachel Elizabeth Dew et al., Religion/Spirituality and Adolescent Psychiatric
Symptoms, CHILD PSYCHIATRY & HuM. DEV. 381, 388 (2008) (noting evidence linking greater
religious participation to lower levels of substance use); Hill et al., supranote 16, at 896-97.
18. See, e.g., Annette Mahoney, Religion and Conflict in Marital and Parent-Child
Relationships, 61 J. SOc. ISSuES 689, 690-91 (2005).
19. Jamilah King, 13 States Introduce Useless Bills to Ban Sharia Law, COLORLINES: NEWS
FOR ACTION (Feb. 9, 2011), http://colorlines.com/archives/2011/02/13statesintroduce-bills-to
ban sharialaw.html.
20. Aaron Fellmeth, InternationalLaw and Foreign Law in the US. State Legislatures, AM.
SOC'Y OF INT'L L. (May 26, 2011), http://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/insight 10526.pdf; King,
supranote 19.
21. John Celock, Sharia Law: Kansas Lawmakers Pass Ban, HUFFINGTON POST (May 11,
2012,
6:24
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/1 1/sharia-law-kansas-ban_n_
1510773.html.
22. See Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1123 (10th Cir. 2012).
23. Andrea Elliot, Behind an Anti-ShariahPush, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2011, at Al (discussing
various viewpoints on whether Sharia law is a threat to American values).
24. See Awad, 670 F.3d at 1123 (suggesting that Muslims have standing because they are
injured by laws that prohibit the use of Sharia law in judicial proceedings).
25. See id (suggesting that Muslims are injured by laws that prohibit consideration of Sharia
law in judicial proceedings); Asma T. Uddin & Dave Pantzer, A FirstAmendment Analysis of AntiSharia Initiatives, 10 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REv. 363, 369 (2012) (discussing the viewpoint that
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However, providing a federal or state solution to help protect these
beliefs can provide Muslim children in foster care, as well as nonMuslim children, shelter from the growing hostility.2 6 While this Note
recognizes a growing hostility within the United States towards Sharia
help protect
law,2 7 it suggests a solution that can be applied generally to
28
the religious rights of all children in the foster care system.
When children are placed into foster care, the state is obligated to
create a plan to provide for the best interests of the child and make
reasonable attempts to reunify the biological parents and the child.29 This
Note considers the question of how foster care agencies can best protect
the religious freedoms of both children in the foster care system and
their biological parents. 3° Part II considers the origins of the foster care
system and the role it plays in rehabilitating parent-child relationships
during the reunification of families that were divided due to voluntarily
or involuntary placement. 31 Part III shows the evolution of the Free
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause (collectively, the
"Religion Clauses" or "Clauses") of the Constitution, and how the
Supreme Court has attempted to reconcile them and create a workable
standard to determine when they have been violated.32 Part IV argues
that the religious freedom of the foster child and of his parents is
unprotected by current federal and state legislative schemes. 33 Although
many states provide for religious considerations before the child enters
foster care, there are no safeguards to protect those religious beliefs
while the child remains there, and biological parents do not have a viable
way to challenge agencies or foster parents when they object to the
religious upbringing of the fostered child.34 Part V suggests both a
federal spending program and a state regulatory program to provide for
protections of religion after the child is placed in a foster home.35 Part VI
concludes, however, that in light of the United States' history of
separation of church and state, along with other objections to greater
federal involvement in foster care administration, a state regulatory

Sharia law is generally incompatible with American values).
26. See infra Part V.
27. See supra notes 23, 25 and accompanying text.
28. See infra Part V.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 67 1(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
30. See infra Part V.
31. See infra Part II.
32. See infra Part HI.
33. See infra Part lV.
34. See discussion infra Part IV.
35. See infra Part V.
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program would ultimately be the best, most plausible solution to address
post-placement religious conflicts in foster homes.36
II. FOSTER CARE HISTORICALLY
This Part discusses the purposes of the foster care system and how
social welfare workers serve families while their children are in the child
welfare system. While the foster care system was initially developed to
prosecute parents for abusing their children, it later developed into an
association that provides services to parents and their children.37 While
Subpart A discusses the evolution of the child welfare system, 38 Subpart
B explains how foster care agencies are required by law to promote the
reunification of the parents and the child and gives examples of two
instances-voluntary placement agreements and permanency planningin which the agency has the opportunity to work with biological parents
to return the child to his parents. 39 Since 1997, federal law has provided
that a child protection agency must provide reasonable efforts to
preserve the unity of the family by providing services to eliminate the
need for the removal of the child.4 ° Subpart C will address the
differences between court interpretations of the substantive due process
rights of biological or adoptive parents and foster parents. 41 Historically,
the Supreme Court has held that parents have a liberty interest in raising
their children, and that there are some laws that are unconstitutional
because they infringe upon a fundamental liberty interest under the
Fourteenth Amendment.42 While it has been recognized that the liberty
interest of biological parents is fundamental, the Court has noted that
foster parents, even those who are the prospective adoptive parents for
the child, only have an identifiable liberty interest when a statute
provides one.4 3 Thus, biological or adoptive parental rights are more
36. See infra Part V1.
37. Brenda G. McGowan, HistoricalEvolution of Child Welfare Services, in CHILD WELFARE
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 10, 17 (Gerald P. Mallon & Peg McCartt Hess eds., 2005).
38. See infra Part II.A.
39. See infra Part ll.B.
40. Adoption and Safe Families Act, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 101, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2006)).
41. See infra Part I.C.
42. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66-67 (2000); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745, 753 (1982) ("[F]reedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923).
43. Compare Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66 (holding that a mother had a fundamental right to rear her
children in the manner she chose), with Rodriguez v. McLoughlin, 214 F.3d 328, 334-35 (2d Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1051 (2001) (citing Rodriguez v. McLoughlin, 49 F. Supp. 2d 186,
196 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that a liberty interest was only recognized in a "discretely identifiable
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extensive than foster parental rights, and foster
parents will only gain
44
them.
for
provides
statute
a
if
rights
additional
A. The Origins and the Purpose of the Foster Care System
Since 2007, over 400,000 children were reported to have been in
foster care each year.45 Of these children, approximately half exited
foster care within the fiscal year of 201 1.46 In 2011, approximately
199,000 foster care children had permanency case goals to reunify with
their parents or principal caretakers.47 Research by the Adoption and
Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System shows that, in 2011, an
estimated 125,900 children exited foster care because they were
reunified with their parents or primary caretakers.4 8 These estimates
show that there were state agencies that succeeded in making
reasonable efforts to reunify the parents and the child, as provided for by
federal law.49
Historically, states legislators believed that society should play a
greater role in state intervention on behalf of children. 50 Because early
organizations focused on prosecuting parents for child abuse, they were
not concerned with providing preventive services to children and their
families.5 1 Later, child welfare service agencies expanded in-home
services to be able to care for children in their own homes, while
providing public assistance for the child and his family.5 2 Modem
child welfare laws show that legislatures continue to require child
set of foster parents" who met particular statutory criteria)).
44. Rodriquez, 214 F.3d at 334-35, 341.
45. See ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
THE AFCARS REPORT (2012) [hereinafter THE AFCARS REPORT], available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/afcarsreportl 9.pdf. This number is substantially higher
than the number of children that were in foster care system in 1982. See Vital Statistics:State of the
Child, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 30, 2001, at 12 (indicating that there were 262,000 children
in foster care in 1982); Jim Moye & Roberta Rinker, It's a HardKnock Life:
Does the Adoption and
Safe FamiliesAct of 1997 Adequately Address Problems in the Child Welfare System?, 39 HARv. J.
ON LEGIS. 375, 376 (2002). Notably, however, the number of children in foster care each year has
been steadily decreasing. See THE AFCARS REPORT, supra.
46.

THE AFCARS REPORT, supranote 45.

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Compare id. (showing that 125,900 children exited foster care because they were reunited
with their parents or primary caretakers), with 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2006) (requiring state
agencies to make reasonable efforts to preserve and unify families).
50. See McGowan, supra note 37, at 16 (noting that, after the founding of the New York
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children in 1984, similar societies were quickly created in
other parts of the country).
51. Id.at 17.
52. Id. at 23.
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to work with families so that children can remain in
welfare agencies
3
their homes.1
Researchers have found that helping to provide services to families4
and engaging with clients are fundamental to the child welfare system.1
The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 ("ASFA")55 provides a
limited time frame for decisions about termination of parental rights and
permanency planning. 6 The limited time frame pushes caseworkers to
make quick decisions about permanency for the child. 7 Therefore,
establishing a relationship with families quickly is essential to5 8ensure the
protection of the child and to create proper permanency goals.
B. Working with BiologicalParents
Federal laws allow for parents to voluntarily place their children

into foster care for up to six months without court review or state
judicial determination that the child remaining in the home would not be
beneficial to his welfare. 9 In order for a placement to be considered
voluntary, the parents of the child must request the assistance of the
agency, and must sign a voluntary placement agreement, which binds the
state agency and the parents or guardians with respect to the "legal status
of the child and the rights and obligations of the parents or guardians, the
child, and the agency while the child is in placement., 60 A state can have
a voluntary placement agreement for a child, which allows the parents to

53. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B). Section 671(a)(15)(B) states that "[rieasonable efforts
shall be made to preserve and reunify families." 1d. These efforts must be made either before the
child is placed in foster care in order to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from
his home, or while the child is in foster care placement to create an environment in which the child
can safely return to his home. 1d.
54. Julie C. Altman, Engagementin Children, Youth, and Family Service, in CHILD WELFARE
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 72, 72, 74-75 (Gerald P. Mallon & Peg McCartt Hess eds.,
2005).

55. Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
56. Id. § 103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E)) (requiring state agencies to file a
petition for termination of parental rights where the child has been in foster care for fifteen of the
most recent twenty-two months). ASFA was passed in 1997 with the goal of correcting many
deficiencies in the child welfare system. Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). State and federal courts must comply with the
requirements of ASFA, and all inconsistent state laws are superseded by ASFA. MAKING SENSE OF
THE ASFA REGULATIONS, supranote 8, at 3-4.
57. See Altman, supra note 54, at 72.
58. See id. at 75.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(2)(A); see Emily Buss, Parents' Rights and Parents Wronged, 57
OHIO ST. L.J. 431, 434 (1996).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 672(f).
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retain custody as long as the state is responsible for the day-to-day care
of the child.6'
Voluntary placement agreements have been widely criticized.62
Scholars see them as the state's attempt to convince parents to volunteer
to place their children in foster care out of fear that if they do not, they
will be seen as uncooperative in future court proceedings.63 Scholars
have labeled voluntary placement agreements as "fictional" since the
parents put their children in placement because they are threatened with
neglect proceedings.64 Voluntary placement agreements are criticized
because when parents sign them, they can either waive or delay right to
counsel, judicial review of reasons for separation, and sometimes even
the right for planning for reunification with their child. 65 These delays
and waivers then make it more difficult for parents to get their children
back from a foster care placement.66
Under ASFA, states are required to have a permanency goal for
each child in foster care.67 This law requires a dispositional hearing to
occur within twelve months from the date the child is considered to have
entered the foster care system. 68 Accordingly, many states have passed
statutes that delineate time frames for when permanency hearings must
take place and what agencies are required to do based on the
permanency goal created for each child.69 Permanency planning involves
61. See id. § 672(a)(2)(B), (f) (describing a relationship where the child is in foster care
placement, and the state and the child's parents have a written agreement with regard to rights and
obligations of both the state and the parents).
62. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 59, at 434 (arguing that voluntary placement agreements
essentially leave parents with no option but to voluntarily place their children in foster care to avoid
facing other consequences); Soledad A. McGrath, Differential Response in Child Protection
Services: Perpetuating the Illusion of Voluntariness, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 629, 671-72 (2012)
(arguing that the voluntariness of voluntary placement agreements is just an illusion). The argument
that voluntary placement agreements tend to coerce parents into placing their children in foster care
is not new. See generally Robert H. Mnookin, Foster Care-In Whose Best Interest?, 43 HARV.
EDUC. REV. 599 (1973) (discussing the features of voluntary placement agreements that pressure
parents into placing their children into foster care). Such arguments recognize that the standards for
removing a child from his home and placing him in foster care fail to give adequate weight to
parental interests in the matter. See id. at 614-15.
63. Buss, supranote 59, at 434; McGrath, supra note 62, at 670.
64. See McGrath, supra note 62, at 670-71; Katherine C. Pearson, Cooperate or We'll Take
Your Child: The Parents' Fictional Voluntary SeparationDecision and a Proposalfor Change, 65
TENN. L. REV. 835, 837 (1998).
65. McGrath, supra note 62, at 670, 676-77; Pearson, supra note 64, at 840.
66. See McGrath, supra note 62, at 671; Pearson, supranote 64, at 841.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 675(1)(A)-(B) (2006).
68. Id. § 675(5)(C).
69. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-862 (2007 & Supp. 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 32A-4-25.1 (2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-1700 (2010 & Supp. 2012). For example, according to
the South Carolina statute:
The family court shall review the status of a child placed in foster care upon motion filed
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the agency working with the family to make a goal for the permanent
placement of the child. v While permanency planning helps the judge
become aware of the agency's progress, it is also a way for caseworkers
to develop goals for each child and his parents and to create a plan
according to those goals.7'
Generally, foster care agencies train caseworkers to create family
service plans, ensure that the foster child has a stable and permanent
home, identify parenting problems that created the need for foster care
placement for the child, and provide services to both the parents and the
child to promote reunification." In seeking permanency for a child,
foster agencies must first seek to reunify the child with his biological
parents.7 3 If reunification with biological parents cannot be achieved, the
agency can have a permanency goal of adoption or legal guardianship, or
a plan for long-term foster care placement for the child. 74 It is important
that the state show that it attempted to prevent the removal of the child
or that it attempted to reunify the biological parents and the child before
adoption can be considered.7 5 Because ASFA shows a clear preference
for reunification with the biological parents, states should make
reasonable efforts to reunify the parents and the child by protecting the
religious activities of children in foster care.76 If a foster family does not
acknowledge the child's religiously important practices, and puts the
religious beliefs of the child in jeopardy, this may negatively impact the
ability of the child and the parents to be reunited.7
by the department to determine a permanent plan for the child. The permanency planning
hearing must be held no later than one year after the date the child was first placed in
foster care. At the initial permanency planning hearing, the court shall review the status
of the child and the progress being made toward the child's return home or toward any
other permanent plan approved at the removal hearing. The court's order shall make
specific findings in accordance with this section.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-1700(A).
70. See David J. Herring, Exploring the Political Roles of the Family: Justificationsfor
Permanency Planningfor Children, 26 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 183, 186-87 (1995).
71. See id. at 186.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 186-87.
74. Id. (stating that reunification with biological parents is the preferred placement plan while
adoption and formally planned long-term foster care is less preferred).
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(26)(A)(i)(I1) (2006). Section 67 1(a)(26)(A)(i)(ll) states:
Within 60 days after the State received from another State a request to conduct a study of
a home environment for purposes of assessing the safety and suitability of placing a
child in the home, the State shall, directly or by contract return to the other State a report
on the results of the study, which shall address the extent to which placement in the
home would meet the needs of the child.
Id.
76. See id; Herring, supra note 70, at 186-87.
77. See Schreiber, supra note 16 (discussing the positive correlation between religiosity of
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ASFA also provides that "procedural safeguards shall be applied
with respect to parental rights pertaining to the removal of the child from
the home of his parents, to a change in the child's placement, and to any
determination affecting visitation privileges of parents."78 However,
there is little detail or further regulatory guidance provided about what
these "procedural safeguards" are.7 9 Therefore, agencies are left to make
these determinations on their own.80
C. Due Process Rights of BiologicalParentsand FosterParents
Furthermore, the religious rights of foster children should be
protected because biological parents have a broader set of rights
concerning the child than foster parents. 8 ' At a minimum, ASFA
suggests that states must afford foster parents and parents in the process
of adopting the child, also known as preadoptive parents, "notice of, and
a right to be heard in, any proceeding with respect to the child." 82 The
law is clear that this guarantee of notice and a right to be heard does not
make foster parents or preadoptive parents parties to those proceedings
concerning the child.83
children and their parents).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(c)(ii).
79. See 45 C.F.R § 1355.21, .25, .33 (2012); Josh Gupta-Kagan, Filling the Due Process
Donut Hole: Abuse and Neglect Cases Between Disposition and Permanency, 10 CONN. PUB. INT.
L.J. 13, 18-19 (2010).
80. Cf 45 C.F.R. §§ 1355-1356 (mentioning procedural safeguards without giving examples
or a definition of what sufficient procedural safeguards might be).
81. See Rodriguez v. McLoughlin, 214 F.3d 328, 334-35 (2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1051
(2001) (citing Rodriguez v. McLoughlin, F. Supp. 2d 186, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)). In Rodriguez, the
Second Circuit held that "a statute that merely establishes procedural requirements does not thereby
create a liberty interest." Id. at 339. For a discussion of the impact, scope, and limitations of
Rodriguez, see generally Katherine S. Wilson, Comment, Not Quite a Family: The Second Circuit
Decides Against Recognizing ProceduralDue Process Rightsfor a Pre-Adoptive FosterFamily in
Rodriguez v. McLoughlin, 67 BROOK. L. REv. 899 (2002).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(G) (Supp. V 2012). But see Wilson, supra note 81, at 923-24
(suggesting that, in certain cases, the court should take into consideration other factors, such as: "(1)
the presence of substantial psychological ties in the absence of a biological parent; (2) the
permanency of [the child's] foster care relationship; and (3) the importance of [the foster mother's]
entering into an Adoptive Placement Agreement with the state for the adoption of [the child]"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(G). Federal law provides that a proper case review system, as defined
by the U.S. Code, ensures that:
[T]he foster parents (if any) of a child and any preadoptive parent or relative providing
care for the child are provided with notice of, and a right to be heard in, any proceeding
to be held with respect to the child except that this subparagraph shall not be construed
to require that any foster parent, preadoptive parent, or relative providing care for the
child be made a party to such a proceeding solely on the basis of such notice and right to
be heard.
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In Troxel v. Granville,84 the Supreme Court held that a statute that
provided for any person to petition for visitation at any time violated the
substantive due process rights of the child's mother.85 Troxel involved
two parents who had never married. 8 6 The parents had two children, and
after the father committed suicide, the mother decided to limit the
children's visitation with their paternal grandparents to one visit a
month.87 The paternal grandparents sought to gain greater visitation
rights by filing a petition under a state statute that provided that any
person could petition the court at any time for visitation rights, and that
the court had the power to order visitation that would be in the best
interest of the child.8 8 The Court found that this statute was
unconstitutional because it violated the substantive due process rights of
the mother, who had a fundamental right to rear her children. 89 The
Court came to this conclusion after an extensive look at the American
tradition of the Court's hesitance to interfere with the role of the parents
in the upbringing of their children. 90 The Court's decision in Troxel
emphasized the importance of noninterference with natural parental
rights. 91 While foster care placement may remove basic natural parental
rights, like physical custody of the child, it is clear that all parental rights
92
are not transferred to foster parents when the child is placed with them.
In fact, the Supreme Court has accepted that foster parent and
preadoptive parental rights are not as extensive as the rights of adoptive
or biological parents.93 Most of the rights of foster or preadoptive
parents solely concern rights to notification of service plans for the child,
rights to notifications of judicial decisions concerning the child, and
rights to receive timely hearings concerning the placement of children in
their home. 94 In Rodriguez v. McLoughlin,95 a four-year-old foster child
had limited contact with his biological mother, and the child welfare

84. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
85. Id. at 61, 75.
86. Id. at 60.
87. Id. at60-61.
88. Id. at 61.
89. Id. at 72-73.
90. Id. at 65-66.
91. See id. at 72-73. But see Emily Buss, Adrift in the Middle: ParentalRights After Troxel v.
Granville, 2000 SuP. CT. REv. 279, 282-83, 296-98 (discussing the Court's opinion in Troxel and
suggesting an alternative test for states to abide by when confronted with the conflict between
parental rights and state interest).
92. See Rodriguez v. McLoughlin, 214 F.3d 328, 334-35 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532
U.S. 1051 (2001).
93. See id.
94. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A § 1-9-119 (West 2009).
95. 214 F.3d 328 (2d Cir. 2000).
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agency and the child's social worker had decided that it would be in the
child's best interest for the child to be adopted. 96 The child's social
worker entered into an adoptive placement agreement with the foster
mother in which the foster mother agreed to keep the child in her home
with the intention of adopting him. 97 The child welfare agency removed
the child from his foster home because they discovered that he and
another foster child, who was three years old, were being supervised by
a twelve-year-old, "emotionally handicapped, special education" child.98
The child's foster mother claimed a violation of substantive due
process rights because when the child was removed and transferred to a
new foster home, the foster mother was (1) denied visitation with the
child while he was out of her care, and (2) denied notice that the child
welfare agency sought independent review of the determination that it
was maltreatment to allow the child to be supervised by the twelve-yearold child. 99 In response to the foster parent's claim that her substantive
due process rights were violated, the Court was clear that the only rights
that she had to the child had to be provided for statutorily. 0 0 In that case,
because the child welfare agency was in New York, the foster parent
only had a liberty interest in three limited instances that were provided
for by statute. 10 1 New York did not have a statute that gave foster parents
02
the right to change a foster child's religion while the child was in care.
In fact, no state statutorily provides for foster parents to have a right to
change the religious denomination of a child in their care. 10 3 This
can be attributed to the general historical notion that biological
parents have a great deal of freedom from state intervention in educating
their children.104
96. Id. at331.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 332.
99. Id. at 332-33.
100. Id. at 339-40.
101. Id. at 334 (citing Rodriguez v. McLoughlin, F. Supp. 2d 186, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)).
Foster parents in New York have the right to notice of proceedings involving the child's status when
they have had custody for more than twelve continuous months. Id. Foster parents also have priority
over others when it comes to the child's adoption, and are eligible for an adoption subsidy when the
child has been in their care for over eighteen months. Id.
102. See id. at 339-40 (discussing the rights that New York state law provides to foster
parents).
103. But see, e.g., Assemb. 4353, 214th Leg. (N.J. 2011) (proposing that a child's religion is
not to be changed when the child enters foster care or when the child is adopted); Assaf, supra note
1 (discussing the possible impact that proposed legislation in New Jersey would have on the rights
of children in foster care).
104. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 400-01 (1923). It should be noted that the Court has never held that a parent's rights to direct
the education of his child is a fundamental right; however, the failure to do so may be to prevent
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Courts have even noted that child welfare systems are unique in
that "the state has a responsibility to act for the parents when the parents
are unable to discharge their own responsibilities."' 0 5 This duty to act for
parents includes the responsibility to meet the religious needs of children
in the child welfare system. 0 6 Additionally, because no state or federal
statute provides that foster parents have a right to interfere with the
religious beliefs of foster children, parents retain the freedom to raise
their child in a certain religion. 10 7 Foster parents should not be allowed
to make decisions concerning what religion the child should practice
while in foster care. 10 8 The foster parents should, to the best of their
abilities, adhere to whatever religious education the biological parents
have bestowed upon their child prior to his placement in foster care.'0 9
Foster care parent involvement in the religious upbringing of foster
children, however, requires both Religion Clauses of the Constitution to
be examined closely, as any solution to the lack of religious
consideration post-placement must adhere to the constitutional
requirements of both Clauses. 10
III. CONSTITUTIONAL RELIGION CLAUSES: PAST AND PRESENT
This Part explores both the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment."' Both of these Clauses
create limitations on the abilities of the government to create and enforce
certain types of programs when they concern religious considerations
and practices." 2 Subpart A will discuss the goals of both the Free
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause, 1 3 while Subpart B will
explain the ways in which the Supreme Court, through development of

undue interference with schools' curriculum decisions. William G. Ross, The Contemporary
Significance of Meyer and Pierce for Parental Rights Issues Involving Education, 34 AKRON L.
REV. 177, 185 (2000).
105. Wilder v. Bernstein, 848 F.2d 1338, 1348 (2d Cir. 1988).
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 214 F.3d at 339-40 (discussing the fact that, until the parental rights
of biological parents are terminated, foster parents necessarily have limited rights to their foster
children).
108. See Assaf, supra note I (describing the harm that can occur when foster parents have too
much of an influence on children's fundamental rights, such as religion).
109. Cf Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35 (supporting the parents' rights to raise their children with
minimal state interference); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400 (supporting the parents' rights to raise their
children with minimal state interference).
110. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Donald L. Beschle, God Bless the Child?: The Use of Religion
as a Factorin Child Custody and Adoption Proceedings,58 FOR~ntAM L. REv. 383, 416 (1989).
111. See discussion infra Part II1.A-C.
112. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
113. See infra Part I.A.
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various tests, has attempted to reconcile the two and protect free exercise
11 4
rights, while avoiding governmental establishment of religion.
Additionally, Subpart C will explore the future of the most widely used
constitutional tests for the Religion Clauses as well as suggested
alternatives. 1 5 Subpart C will also discuss limitations that must be
considered in any legislation concerning religious matching in foster
care, so that any proposed solution16 conforms to the constitutional
requirements of the Religion Clauses."
A. Establishment Versus Free Exercise
Under the First Amendment to the Constitution, Congress is
restrained from making laws that establish religion. 1 7 The First
Amendment also provides that Congress cannot create laws that prevent
the free exercise of religion.1 18 The underlying premise of arguments
supporting the Free Exercise Clause is that private religious values and
beliefs can serve as a check on governmental power.'1 9 On the other
hand, the Establishment Clause helps to enforce the idea that religion is
a separate source of values and should be independent from
government. 120 The Establishment Clause was intended to prevent
government "sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement" in
religious activity. 121
The 1988 case, Wilder v. Bernstein,22 is a leading case on the
development of law in the area of religious matching in foster care as
well as an example of the court examining the limits of the Free Exercise
and Establishment Clauses. 123 Wilder involved a settlement agreement in
which New York foster care agencies were required to place a child in
the best available program if the child's parents expressed a religious
preference. 24 Wilder, however, dealt with the interaction of religious
considerations and the child welfare system before the child was placed

114.
115.
116.
117.

See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part HI.C.
See infra Part III.C.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.

118.

Id.

119. Alan Brownstein, The Religion Clauses as Mutually Reinforcing Mandates: Why the
Arguments for Rigorously Enforcing the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause Are
Stronger When Both Clauses Are Taken Seriously, 32 CARDOZO L. REv. 1701, 1706-07 (2011).
120. Id. at 1707.
121. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
122. 848 F.2d 1338 (2d Cir. 1988).
123. Michael P. Kennedy, Comment, In the Best Interest of the Child: Religious and Racial
Matching in Foster Care,3 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 299, 304-07 (1993).
124. Wilder, 848 F.2d at 1343-44.
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into foster care. 125 The settlement agreement discussed in that case never
addressed how religious considerations would be handled after the child
was placed into foster care, or if the child happened to be placed in a
home in which the foster parents did not have the same religion or
26
religious practices as the child.
Importantly, however, Wilder does consider a way in which the
Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause can be implicated in
the context of providing welfare services to children.' 27 In that case,
appellants, who objected to a settlement agreement in part on the
grounds that it created an entanglement between the government and
religious agencies which violated the Establishment Clause and in part
on the grounds that the Free Exercise Clause would be violated because
the settlement would reduce the frequency of religiously-matched foster
care placement, were denied judicial relief. 28 In that case, the court held
that, although the settlement's terms stated that children would be placed
in religiously-matched homes on a first-come first-serve basis; this did
not violate the Free Exercise Clause just because there would inevitably
be many children who would not be able to be placed, since there was a
great amount of Catholic and Jewish children, and not enough homes for
them. 129 This settlement term, the court noted, was an effort of the
parties to take into account the limitations of the Establishment
Clause. 30 With regard to the appellants' argument about the settlement
violating the Establishment Clause, the court held that the standard to
determine entanglement between religious agencies and the government
must be relaxed in the context of child welfare because of the special
role of child welfare agencies. 131 Because foster care agencies are
responsible for exercising the judgment of parents who are unable to do
so themselves, they must either allocate resources to manage the
religious education portion of parental care, or take action themselves to
make sure the religious needs of children in foster care are met.132 Either
way, the state must concern itself, in some fashion, with religion more
33
than it would in other circumstances, such as education. 1

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 1343-45.
Id. at 1343-47.
Id. at 1346-49.
Id. at 1343, 1346-47, 1350.
Id. at 1346-47.
Id. at 1347.
Id.
Id. at 1348.
See id.
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B. Religion Clause Tests: The Basics
The conflicting goals of both the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause have caused the Supreme Court to become involved in
establishing limitations on the extent of the two. 134 Scholars have noted
that there are "articulable tests for analysis of establishment clause and
free exercise clause cases," that have not created standardized and
predictable results in Religion Clause cases. 135 While there have been
suggested alternatives, scholars note that the test established in Lemon v.
Kurtzman136-- commonly known as the Lemon test-is the standard to
measure the Establishment Clause claims that individuals bring against
the government. 37 While the Lemon test has been applied, 38 it has also
been modified by subsequent case law,
and the modified version remains
139
in use by the federal appellate courts.
In Lemon, the Court announced a three-prong test to determine if14a0
state program violated the Establishment Clause of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court held that a statute concerning religion must have a
secular legislative purpose, it must neither advance nor inhibit religion,
and it must not create excessive entanglement between government and
religion. '4' In determining if there is excessive entanglement between
the government and religion, the Court looks at the purposes of
134. See, e.g., Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874, 890 (1990) (upholding a state policy
that an individual could not collect unemployment if he had been terminated from work due to drug
use for religious reasons); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207, 214 (1972) (holding a state
statute unconstitutional that required compulsory attendance at school until age sixteen, where there
was a conflict with age-old Amish tradition); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606-07 (1971)
(holding a Pennsylvania state law unconstitutional that provided reimbursement to public schools
that taught secular subjects, and holding a Rhode Island statute unconstitutional that supplemented
salaries ofnonpublic school teachers).
135. See Beschle, supranote 110, at 394; Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element
of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 933, 940 (1986) (suggesting a modification of the
Court's three-part test for an establishment of religion to a noncoercion standard that would allow
the government to "pursue its legitimate purposes even if to do so incidentally assists the various
religions"); Simcha David Schonfeld, A Failing Grade: The Court in Zelman and Its Missed
Opportunity to Clarify the Confusing State of Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 20 T.M.
COOLEY L. REV. 489, 505 (2003) (expressing a disappointment, in light of recent case decisions, in
the Court's inadequate explanation of what the endorsement test entails).
136. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
137. Beschle, supra note 110, at 391-92.
138. See, e.g., Freethought Soc'y v. Chester Cnty., 334 F.3d 247, 256, 259-60 (3d Cir. 2003);
Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 552-53 (10th Cir. 1997).
139. See Freethought Soc'y, 334 F.3d at 259-60 & n.9 (applying, instead, the "endorsement
test" that seeks to elicit whether the practice in question sends a message to reasonable observers
that they are outsiders to a religious practice and that the government action is perceived as
endorsing religion); Bauchman, 132 F.3d at 551-53 (applying the endorsement test).
140. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
141. Id.
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institutions that benefit from government action, the type of aid provided
to the institution by the government, and the type of relationship that is
created between the government and the religious institution when the
statute went into effect.1 42 The Court has found excessive entanglement
where a government program has created a situation in which the sole
beneficiaries are schools dedicated to the mission of promoting the
Catholic faith. 143 The Lemon test has remained one of the most
commonly used tests in Establishment Clause cases.' 44
Following Lemon, the Court used an opportunity in Wisconsin v.
Yoder 14 5 to make a ruling on the limits that the Free Exercise Clause
places on state action. 146 In this case, Wisconsin passed a statute that
required children to attend school until age sixteen. 147 The respondents,
the Yoder family, had refused to send their children to school after
completion of the eighth grade because their religious doctrine taught
that continuing secondary education created an unacceptable exposure to
worldly influences.148 The Court articulated that in order for the State to
succeed in implementing compulsory school attendance beyond the
eighth grade, it would have to show that it did not deny free exercise of
religion, or, in the alternative, that there was an overriding state interest
that would prevent the respondents from claiming protection under the
Free Exercise Clause. 149 The Court noted that, even where there may be
an important social purpose for upholding a particular statute, free
exercise of religion must be protected. 50 In holding that Wisconsin's
compulsory attendance law violated the respondents' free exercise
rights, the Court emphasized that not attending school past the eighth
grade was fundamental to their faith and that the law would
"affirmatively compel[] them, under threat of criminal sanction, to
perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of their
religious beliefs.' 51 The Court's decision in Yoder, however, was
142. See id. at 615.
143. Id.at 615-16. The Court, in Lemon, also found entanglement where a state program
evaluated school records to determine the religious content of a religious organization; this type of
close arrangement created a relationship "pregnant with dangers of excessive government direction
of church schools and hence of churches." Id.at 620.
144. See Lisa M. Kahle, Comment, Making "Lemon-Aid"from the Supreme Court's Lemon:
Why Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence Should Be Replaced by a Modified Coercion

Test, 42
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

SAN DIEGO L. REV. 349, 352 (2005).
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
See id.
at 214.
Id. at 207.
Id. at 210-11.
Id. at 214.

150. See id.

151.

Id. at 216-19.
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limited to very specific facts. 152 The Court has continued to hold 53that
free exercise of religion can be limited under certain circumstances.
In Employment Division v. Smith, 15 4 the Court held that a state law
prohibiting possession of controlled substances-unless prescribed by a
medical practitioner-did not infringe upon respondents' free exercise
rights. 5 5 In defining controlled substances, the statute specifically
included peyote, a hallucinogenic plant. 5 6 In Employment Division, the
respondents were members of a religious denomination that used
"peyote for sacramental purposes.' 57 They were fired for the use of the
drug, and were subsequently unable to collect unemployment benefits. 158
In holding that the state law, which labeled peyote as an impermissible
controlled substance, did not infringe the respondents' free exercise
rights, the Court explained that generally applicable laws which impinge
religious action are unconstitutional only if the claim involves
constitutional protections aside from the Free Exercise Clause. 59 In the
case of Yoder, however, the respondents only claimed a violation of the
First Amendment because there was "otherwise prohibitable conduct
accompanied by religious convictions."' 160 The Court held that the
underlying conduct itself had to be something out of the reach of
government regulation; otherwise, the respondents would not have a free
exercise claim.' 6' The Court also emphasized that it could not apply a
"compelling state interest" test because there was no legal principle that
could determine whether or not an individual's belief was central to his
make a determination on the position of a
religion. 162 The Court cannot
1 63
belief within a religion.

These tests must be relevant considerations in trying to remedy the
problem of a lack of religious considerations of children in foster care
after they have been placed with a foster family.16 4 While children and
their parents have religious freedoms, the foster parents have religious
152. Id. at 234-36.
153. See, e.g., Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
154. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

155. Id. at 874, 890.
156. Id. at 874.
157. Id.

158. Id.
159. Id. at 881.
160. Id. at 881-82.
161. Id. at 882.
162. Id. at 886-87.
163. Id. at 887.
164. See Kelsi Brown Corkran, Comment, Free Exercise in FosterCare:Defining the Scope of
Religious Rights for Foster Children and Their Families, 72 U. C-II. L. Rev. 325, 329-30, 338-40,
347 (2005).
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freedoms as well. 165 Any solution to account for religious considerations
after a child is placed in foster care must not violate the Establishment
Clause and must not infringe upon the free exercise rights of the
biological parent, the child, or the foster parent. 166 There are further
considerations about whether a solution to this problem should be aimed
at protecting the religious practices and beliefs that the biological parents
have taught their child, or the religious practices and beliefs that the
child has developed himself.167 This Note adopts the perspective that not
allowing the child to maintain religious practices while in foster care is a
violation of the parents' rights to raise their child by the doctrines of
particular religious denomination;
it is from this perspective that the
16
solution is suggested. 1
C. Interpretationand Application of the Religion Clauses
Recently, scholars have pushed for the Supreme Court to consider
reconfiguring the application of the Lemon test in Establishment Clause
cases. 69 While the Lemon test is the most commonly used test for
determining whether a statute violates the Establishment Clause, this
standard has been relaxed over the years by the introduction of the
endorsement test. 7 ° While the Lemon test focuses on a statute's
entanglement with religion, the endorsement test focuses more on
whether or not the statute endorses or disapproves of a particular religion
165. See id. at 347-50 (discussing the relevance of the religious beliefs of foster parents when
considering the free exercise rights of children in foster care and their parents).
166. See id. at 328, 331-32 ("It is reasonable to conclude, then, that foster home activity is
subject to constitutional constraints on government action, including the Free Exercise Clause.").
167. See generally Matt Steinberg, Note, Free Exercise of Religion: The Conflict Between a
Parent's Rights and a Minor Child's Right in Determining the Religion of the Child, 34 U.
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 219 (1995). The constitutional rights of children have historically been
placed "in the hands of their parents." Id. at 222. Courts have been reluctant, however, to equate the
rights of children with the rights of adults, due to the inability of children to make informed and
mature decisions. Id. at 222-23; see, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (discussing
the obligations of parents to inculcate their children with "moral standards, religious beliefs, and
elements of good citizenship"). For another discussion of the importance of children's interests in
religious considerations, see Martha Albertson Fineman, Taking Children's Interests Seriously, in
WHAT IS RIGHT FOR CHILDREN? THE COMPETING PARADIGMS OF RELIGION AND HuMAN RIGHTS

229,229 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Karen Worthington eds., 2009). The discussion of whether a
solution should protect the religious beliefs that the biological parents have taught their child or the
religious beliefs that the child has developed on his own, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
168. See infra Part V.
169. See, e.g., Schonfeld, supra note 135, at 501; Kahle, supra note 144, at 386-87; see also
Brief of Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation, Independent Voices for Better Education,
Teachers for Better Education, Ira J. Paul and Robert N. Wright in Support of Petitioners at 12-13,
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 539 U.S. 639 (2002).
170. See Schonfeld, supra note 135, at 493; see also, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,
220 (1997).
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or religious belief. 17 1 A third and final test that the Court has used is the
coercion test, which focuses on whether the statute in question pushes an
individual to participate in religious activity. 7 2 However, the future of
the Lemon test is unclear because of the alternatives that exist and the
recent criticism that the entanglement
prong is inappropriate for
73
Establishment Clause analysis. 1
The Lemon test has been difficult to use because Supreme Court
justices have questioned whether the test is effective in providing
concrete results in Establishment Clause cases, particularly since the test
requires courts to determine subjective legislative intent. 174 Determining
subjective legislative intent is always difficult, and focusing on
subjective legislative intent gives legislators a motive to lie about their
justifications for supporting bills that affect religion. 75 The Court,
however, seems to disfavor this approach, preferring a more relaxed and
objective standard, which
could ultimately bring more certainty to First
76
litigation.
Amendment
IV. Do PARENTS HAVE ANY VIABLE REMEDY AGAINST
FOSTER CARE AGENCIES?

This Part considers the various remedies that current law provides
parents when they either suspect that a state with a religious-matching
statute does not provide reasonable efforts to place the child with a
family of the child's religion, or when reasonable efforts are
unsuccessfully made and the child is placed with a family that ultimately
behaves in a manner that threatens to alter or actually does alter the
religion or religious beliefs of the foster child. 7 7 Subpart A argues that
biological parents in this situation would not be able to bring a claim for
the violation of a private right under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.78 This Subpart
also explains that, in light of the Court's interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause, biological parents in many situations are unable to
bring a successful claim for deprivation of private rights for the violation
of First Amendment free exercise rights. 179 Subpart B explores the
171. Schonfeld, supra note 135, at 493; see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
172. Schonfeld, supra note 135, at 495; see, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
173. Schonfeld, supra note 135, at 503.
174. Kahle, supra note 144, at 356. The first prong of the three-prong test is that the statute
must have a secular legislative intent. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (majority opinion).
175. Kahle, supranote 144, at 357-58.
176. See id.
at 356, 361.
177. See infra Part IV.A-B.
178. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); see infra Part IV.A.
179. See infra Part W.A.
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standard of the best interests of the child, and concludes that, while
religion may be an important consideration in reuniting foster children
and their parents, it would often be a secondary factor to more pressing
concerns, and thus, the best interests standard would not be an adequate
solution for parents to challenge whether the religion of the child was
being acknowledged. 80 While religion may not be the most important
concern, it certainly can effect a child in a way that could help make
long-term care and adoption or short-term care and eventual
reunification with the parents an easier process. 8 '
A. No Violation of a PrivateRight Under § 1983
Individuals have a private right of action for deprivation of
constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.182 In Suter v. Artist M,83
the Supreme Court held that the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare
Act of 1980 ("Adoption Act") 184 did not confer an enforceable federal
right for parents. 85 In that case, the statute in question had provided for
"[s]tates receiving funds for adoption assistance to have a 'plan' to make
'reasonable efforts' to keep children out of foster homes.' 86 In order for
an individual to have a private right of action under this statute,
Congress must manifest an87 "unambiguous" intent to confer individual
rights upon the individual.
In Suter, the Court examined the provision of the Adoption Act that
established a program through which the federal government would
reimburse states for certain expenses pertaining to foster care and
adoption services.18 8 In that case, respondents argued that the state foster
care agency failed to make reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of
the child and to promote reunification once the child had been removed
from the home. 89 The Court was presented with the issue of whether the
Adoption Act unambiguously conferred upon foster children the right to

180. See infra Part IV.B.
181. See Dew et al., supra note 17, at 388 (suggesting that increased religious activity
correlates with lower levels of adolescent substance abuse); Hill et al., supra note 16, at 896-97
(suggesting that increased religious activity correlates with more favorable parenting outcomes);
Mahoney, supra note 18, at 690-91 (suggesting that religious activity may help decrease family
conflict).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
183. 503 U.S. 347 (1992).
184. Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
185. See Suter, 530 U.S. at 363.
186. § 101,94 Stat. at 503; Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 281 (2002).
187. Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 281.
188. Suter, 530 U.S. at 350-51.
189. Id. at 352.
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enforce these provisions against the states.1 90 In holding that the
Adoption Act did not create a right under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court
emphasized that the wording of the statute left the states with broad
discretion to determine reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the
child from the home or to reunite the child with his parents.' 9' The
Adoption Act contained enforcement mechanisms, such as the authority
to reduce or eliminate payment to a state that did not follow its own plan
or the requirements of the Adoption Act, but the statute did not have any
language that showed that Congress unambiguously created a private
right of action for individuals.' 92
Subsequently, however, Congress enacted the Improving America's
Schools Act of 1994,193 which provided that any provision in Chapter
531 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code was not "deemed unenforceable
because of its inclusion in a section of this chapter requiring a State Plan
or specifying the required contents of a State plan." 194 The statute also
specifically stated that it would not alter the decision of the Court in
Suter.195 Thus, there is no private right of action for foster care children
and their families if the foster care agency
does not make reasonable
96
efforts to preserve and reunify families.
More recently, parents brought suit against a state child protection
agency alleging that it violated conditions for receipt of foster care
funding because, after removing their children, the agency "placed them
in different foster homes from each other, and failed to place them with
foster families 'who respected and followed [the foster children's]
religious, ethnic or cultural background."" 197 They also alleged that the
child protection agency in New Hampshire did not make diligent efforts
to recruit potential foster or adoptive families to reflect the ethnic and
190. Id. at357.
191. See id. at 360 (stating that the meaning of "reasonable efforts" varies with the
circumstances and thus the state has broad discretion).
192. Id.at 360,363.
193. Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 &42
U.S.C.).
194. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2 (2012).
195.

Id. Section 1320a-2 states:

This section is not intended to limit or expand the grounds for determining the
availability of private actions to enforce State plan requirements other than by
overturning any such grounds applied in Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992), but
not applied in prior Supreme Court decisions respecting such enforceability; provided,
however, that this section is not intended to alter the holding in Suter v. Artist M. that

section 671(a)(15) of this title is not enforceable in a private right of action.
Id.; see Jeanine B. ex rel. Blondis v. Thompson, 877 F. Supp. 1268, 1282-84 (E.D. Wis. 1995).
196. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2 (explaining that the statute neither limits nor expands private
rights to enforce state foster care plans).
197. BK v. N.H. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 814 F. Supp. 2d 59,61 (D. N.H. 2011).
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racial diversity of the children.198 In BK v. New Hampshire Department
ofHealth and Human Services,9 9 three minor children, all siblings, were
removed from their home and placed in foster care with different
families. 200 Their parents, born in India, raised them in the Hindu faith
and taught them that the cow was sacred; they were not allowed to eat
beef or eat off dishes on which beef was cooked, or live in households in
which beef was consumed. 201 The parents alleged that they offered to
supply food for their children when they became aware that the children
were placed in a home that did not recognize Hindu religious practices;
however, the foster parents rejected this offer.20 2 The parents also
alleged that two of the children were taken to a Christian church on a
weekly basis.20 3
In holding that the plaintiffs did not state a claim for which relief
could be granted, the court emphasized that any attempt of Congress to
impose requirements on the states by way of the Spending Clause must
be unambiguous. 20 4 The court held that there was no clear standard to
enforce the requirement that reasonable efforts should be made to place
siblings in the same foster home or promote the reunification of the
children and their parents, and thus, followed the majority interpretation
of 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2. 20 5 The court also examined the plaintiffs'
allegations that the agency did not diligently recruit foster or adoptive
families to reflect the ethnic and racial diversity of the state.20 6 The court
held that, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2, the plaintiffs did not have a
private right of action because the term "diligent recruitment" did not
provide enough guidance or notice to the states about what was required
of them.20 7 Thus, because the courts have been consistent in holding that
language such as "reasonable efforts" and "diligent recruitment" are
insufficient to provide a private right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for individuals who allege that they have been harmed by a state's
failure to meet certain requirements under federal statutes, it is unlikely
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 62.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id at 63.
204. Id. at 66, 69, 71.
205. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2 (2006); BK, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 66, 68-69. The majority interpretation
of 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2 is that the statute does not require the courts to revisit case law that existed
before Suter. BK, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 69. Courts are allowed to "follow Suter except insofar as it
applied 'grounds for determining the availability of private actions to enforce State plan
requirements."' Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2).
206. BK, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 71.
207. Id.
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that parents seeking to recover under these provisions of the Adoption
Act or ASFA will ever be provided with a private right of action when
they allege that the foster agency did not make reasonable efforts for
reunification of the child and the parent.2 °8
Additionally, parents will most likely be unable to recover under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of their First Amendment rights if they
20 9
allege that their right to free exercise of religion has been violated.
Since 1925, the Supreme Court has held that states should respect
parental liberty regarding the education and upbringing of children.210
The free exercise rights of parents are of constitutional significance, and
parents are exercising this right when they make choices and select
religious experiences for their children. 211 However, a significant factor
in determining the extent of the rights of the individual is his legal
status-for example, a child in custody of his natural parents or a child
legally in state custody.2 12
For instance, the Supreme Court has held that prisoners are still
afforded protection under the First Amendment; 213 however, the Court
has also held that incarceration may limit the exercise of constitutional
rights due to valid security objectives of prison administrators. 1 4 This
comparison does not suggest that foster children deserve the same
treatment or are in similar circumstances as prisoners, but it does suggest
that children in foster care or parents who voluntarily place their
children in foster care may warrant different treatment.2 15 Generally,
courts have noted that there can be limitations on parenting choices
when parents use religious grounds to refuse necessary medical
treatment for their child.216 Courts have also held that, the rights of
parents are "not absolute where... a parent voluntarily gives, or
involuntarily loses, custody of a child to the state, which subsequently
places the child in foster care. 217
At least two district courts have held that parents do not have a free
exercise claim when they allege that foster parents acted against their
208.
209.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2; Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 364 (1992).
See infra notes 210-25 and accompanying text.

210. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
211. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972).
212.
213.

Kennedy,supra note 123, at315.
Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (per curiam). For a discussion of the constitutional
rights of incarcerated persons, see generally U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ENFORCING
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN PRISON (2008).

214.
215.
216.
1967).
217.

O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987).
See Kennedy,supra note 123, at315.
See, e.g.,
Jehovah's Witnesses v. King Cnty. Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488, 504 (W.D. Wash.
Pfoltzer v. Fairfax, 775 F. Supp. 874, 885 (E.D. Va. 1991).
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wishes in raising their child with certain religious values.218 In Walker v.
Johnson,2 19 the plaintiff claimed a violation of the First Amendment
because her children attended Protestant Sunday school classes after she
previously stated that she did not want them to. 220 In Pfoltzer v. County
ofFairfax,221 the plaintiffs' claim was based on allegations that while in
foster care, their children were not permitted to practice their faith
pursuant to the preference the plaintiffs had suggested. 2 In both cases,
the courts held that the rights of the parents to have control over the
religious upbringing of their children were not absolute once the child
was in foster care.223 Courts have held that states are, at most, required to
make reasonable efforts to place children in homes with foster parents
practicing the same religion; however, absent some state regulation, the
state has no duty to do so. 2 24 Once the state makes a reasonable effort to
place the child with a religious match, the parents most likely will not
have a viable First Amendment claim, and the state is not required, by
statute or regulation, to do anything else except look at the overall best
interests of the child.225
B. The Best Interests of the ChildStandardIs Insufficient
In order to determine what foster home a child is placed in when
the state takes custody, the federal government has adopted the broad
best interest of the child standard.226 States have also enacted legislation
that requires the best interest of the child to be the standard used when
making child welfare decisions in the context of foster care placement or
child custody.227 This standard focuses on the idea that the child's
interest is of paramount concern when both the custody of the child and
218. See, e.g., Walker v. Johnson, 891 F. Supp. 1040, 1048-49 (M.D. Pa. 1995); Pfoltzer, 775
F. Supp. at 885.
219. 891 F. Supp. 1040 (M.D. Pa. 1995).
220. Id. at 1047.
221. 775 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Va. 1991).
222. Id. at 877, 885.
223. Walker, 891 F. Supp. at 1048; Pfoltzer, 775 F. Supp. at 885.
224. See Walker, 891 F. Supp. at 1048-49; Pfoltzer, 775 F. Supp. at 885.
225. See Walker, 891 F. Supp. at 1049; Pfoltzer, 775 F. Supp. at 885.
226. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(xiii)(Il) (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (providing that state
governors must submit assurance that their state plan has provisions requiring the state to make
court recommendations in the best interests of the child in cases involving victims of child abuse
and neglect); 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(26)(A)(ii) (2006) (requiring state plans to compel the completion
of home studies within seventy-five days if state documents certify that a home study would be in
the best interests of the child).
227. E.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/609(a) (West 2007 & Supp. 2013); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 260C.601(2)(1) (West Supp. 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-4-201(2) (2011); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:3-40 (West 2002 & Supp. 2013); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 240(1)(a)(4) (McKinney 2010 & Supp.
2013).
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the child's placement is in controversy. 228 Because it is discretionary, a
caseworker may not factor in religion229as a consideration when there are
other factors that are more important.
When a determination of the best interest of the child needs to be
made, states require agencies to make the decision based on a number of
factors. 3 ° In some states, these enumerated factors may include: the
physical and mental well-being of a child; the child's background and
family ties; the child's sense of attachment; the constitutional rights of
all parties involved; and the importance of the birth family
relationship.23 1 In other states, the statutory requirement of using the
standard of the best interest of the child only guides caseworkers by
informing them that the paramount concern in all decisions is the child's
health and safety.232 Where caseworkers are statutorily bound to make
placement determinations, especially in states with statutes which
indicate that the child's health and safety are of paramount concern and
there is a situation involving abuse or neglect, religious considerations
may very well be put on the backburner, although religion might be
something important to that child and his family.23 3 Therefore, because

religion is only a discretionary factor,234 there is a high risk that it will
be overshadowed.235
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Although religious matching is statutorily provided for in many
states,236 the statutes are ineffective where states do not have a
regulatory system in place to help ensure that the religious rights of
foster care children and their parents are protected.237 In June 2012,
228. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 105 (1979).
229. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-1 1.1(a) (West 2008) (explaining that "the child's health and
safety shall be of paramount concern"); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 358-a(3)(c) (McKinney 2003 &
Supp.2013).
230. See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2007 & Supp. 2013); Mo. REv.
STAT. § 211.443 (2013).
231. See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/1-3(4.05); Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.443.
232. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-1 1.1(a); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 358-a(3)(c).
233. See, e.g., Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M.K, No. FG-16-104-08, 2010 WL
1526321, at *15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 19, 2010).
234. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/1-3(4.05); Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.443.
235. See Walker v. Johnson, 891 F. Supp. 1040, 1049 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (holding that transfer of
the children to a different foster home in order to abide with the parents' wish that the children be
cared for by persons of the same religion would disrupt the children's lives due to the length of time
that they had already stayed with the family).
236. E.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:33 (2002); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 373. New York
also has a state constitutional provision that requires reasonable efforts to be made to place foster
children in homes with foster caretakers of the same religion. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 32.
237. See Corkran, supranote 164, at 329-30.
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Congressman John Conyers introduced the Rehab and Ahmed Amer
Foster Care Improvement Act of 2012 ("Foster Care Improvement
Act"). 238 The Foster Care Improvement Act was introduced after parents
"lost two of their children to Michigan's foster care system," following
the accidental death of their son in 1985.239 Although the mother was
acquitted of any criminal wrongdoing in 1986, the state refused to return
those two children to the parents, and also removed a third child from
their home. 24' After the parents were acquitted of the criminal charges
against them, they found out that their three other children, who they had
raised in the Muslim faith, had been converted and ultimately raised as
Christians. 241 Although the children's uncle, who had previously served
as their foster parent, petitioned for temporary custody of the children,
the court denied the petition and the children lived with an evangelical
Christian family that renamed the children with Christian names and
raised them as Christians.242 These events inspired Representative John
Conyers, Jr. from Michigan to introduce the
Foster Care Improvement
244
Act,243 which promotes kinship foster care.
Kinship foster care allows for "kinship guardianship assistance
agreements" to provide payments to relatives who have assumed
guardianship of children they have cared for as foster parents.245 States
are not currently mandated to participate in kinship foster care. 246 If
passed, a statute such as the Foster Care Improvement Act would
provide that state agencies must consider placing the child in kinship
foster care before attempts are made to place the child with a foster
238. Rehab and Ahmed Amer Foster Care Improvement Act of 2012, H.R. 6021, 112th Cong.
This bill was reintroduced in Congress in 2013. Rehab and Ahmed Amer Foster Care Improvement
Act of 2013, H.R. 102, 113th Cong.
239. Matthew Morgan, H.R. 6021, the "Rehab and Ahmed Amer Foster CareImprovement Act
of

2012,"

MUSLIM

FOSTER

&

FAM.

SERVICES

(June

26,

2012,

8:05

PM),

http://www.muslimfosterandfamilyservices.blogspot.com/2012/06/hr-6021 -rehab-and-ahmed-amerfoster.html.
240. Id.
241. Gregg Krupa & Shante6 Woodards, Judge Orders Muslim Kids to Be Christians,
ISLAMNEWSROOM.COM, http://www.islamnewsroom.com/news-we-need/360-muslimchildren2 (last
visited Feb. 16, 2014).
242. Morgan, supranote 239.
243. H.R. 6021,
244. Id. Some scholars argue that kinship foster care is the answer to creating more instances
of reunification between the parents and the child after a child is placed in the foster care system.
See generally David J. Herring et al., Evolutionary Theory and Kinship Foster Care: An Initial Test
of Two Hypotheses, 38 CAP. U. L. REV. 291 (2009); Megan M. O'Laughlin, Note, A Theory of
Relativity: Kinship Foster Care May Be the Key to Stopping the Pendulum of Terminations vs.
Reunification, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1427 (1998) (discussing the benefits of kinship foster care).
245. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(28) (2006 & Supp. V2012).
246. Id. (stating that it is the option of the state to enter into kinship guardianship agreements
with relatives of foster children).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol42/iss2/8

28

Brown: In the System: Facilitating the Reunification of the Child and th

2013]

FACILITATING REUNIFICATION THROUGH RELIGION

family that is unrelated to the child.247 The Foster Care Improvement Act
has not yet been enacted; 248 however, if enacted, this statute could
foreseeably begin to help correct the problem of post-placement
religious considerations by having foster care agencies seek out adult
relatives of the child who would be more likely to maintain the child's
religious upbringing.2 49 Subpart A suggests a federal spending program,
broader than that of the Foster Care Improvement Act, which would help
regulate religious activity of foster care children after placement,
especially when the foster care agency may not be able to find adult
relatives or a foster care family of the same religion.25 ° Subpart A argues
that a federal spending program is desirable to create uniformity
among the states in how they manage this problem.25I As an
alternative, Subpart B suggests a state program that may work better in
light of possible objections that could be raised against a federal
spending program.252
A. A FederalRegulatory Solution
A federal spending program is a possible way to require states to
take the religious beliefs of children taken into foster care into
consideration.253 In light of the Spending Clause of the Constitution, the
House of Representatives has considered that it, along with the Senate,
has the authority to pass federal legislation regarding state procedures in
placing children removed from the custody of their parents.2 54 While the
Foster Care Improvement Act involves using kinship foster care as a
vehicle to help protect the religious activity of children in foster care,
this Note proposes a federal spending program, similar to that

247. See H.R. 6021. Legislators have also made previous attempts to establish programs that
would establish a Kinship Navigator Program that would promote helping kinship caregivers to
"navigate existing programs and services to help them learn about and obtain assistance to meet the
needs of the children they are raising, and their own needs." Summary of the Kinship Caregiver
Support Act (S. 985), CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., http://www.cwla.org/advocacy/
summarykinshipact.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). A Kinship Navigator Program would provide
money to states and agencies with experience working with kinship caregivers so that they may
improve and better address the needs of kinship caregivers. Id.
248. See Rehab and Ahmed Amer Foster Care Improvement Act of 2013, H.R. 102, 113th
Cong.
249. See id.
250. See infra Part V.A.
251. See infra Part V.A.
252. See infra Part V.B.
253. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (stating that the federal government
is allowed to condition state receipt of federal funding on provisions relating to general welfare);
158 CONG. REC. H4064 (daily ed. June 26, 2012); infra Part V.A.1.
254. See 158 CONG. REC. H4064 (statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr.).
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envisioned in the Foster Care Improvement Act, which would protect the
religious practices of a broader group of foster care children, namely
those without kin.2 " Under such a program, the federal government
would only decrease state foster care funds if the state did not develop a
mechanism to protect the religious activity of children in foster care
when the biological parents raise the issue. 6
1. Authority Under the Spending Clause
In order to implement a spending program, Congress must adhere
to three general constitutional limitations. 57 In South Dakota v. Dole,2 58
the Supreme Court held that when Congress engages in a spending
program under Article I, Section 8, Clause I of the U.S. Constitution, the
spending must be for the general welfare; the states must be able to
knowingly decide whether to participate in the program; and the
conditions of the program must relate to a federal interest in the national
program or project. 9 In Dole, the Court analyzed whether Congress had
constitutional authority to create a federal spending program that would
decrease a state's highway funding by five percent if the state did not
increase its legal drinking age to twenty-one.2 60 The first limitation, that
the spending must be for the general welfare, was satisfied because there
61
was a national problem with individuals driving while intoxicated.
The second restriction, that the states must be able to knowingly decide
whether to participate in the program, was satisfied when the Court
stated that Congress clearly listed the conditions upon which the states
would receive their federal funds.2 62 Finally, the Court found the third
limitation, that the conditions of the spending program must have a
relation to a federal interest in a national program or project, was
satisfied when the Court declared that "the condition imposed by
Congress [was] directly related to one of the main purposes for which
highway funds [were] expended-safe interstate travel., 263 The Court
held that federal funds could not be conditioned on an activity that was
unconstitutional, and that a five percent decrease in highway funding
255. See discussion supra Part V.A; see also Rehab and Ahmed Amer Foster Care
Improvement Act of 2012, H.R. 6021, 112th Cong.
256. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (describing the federal government's ability to condition state
receipt of federal funding).
257. See id.
258. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
259. Id.at 207.
260. Id. at 205.
261. Id.at 208.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 208-09.
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was only "relatively mild encouragement to the States to enact higher
minimum drinking ages than they would otherwise choose.
The Court has continued to hold that Congress may only use its
enumerated powers of taxing and spending to encourage the states to
adopt policies and legislation that it could not directly impose.26 5 In
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,266 the Court
considered whether a Medicaid expansion that required the states to
expand Medicaid coverage to cover a greater number of people exceeded
Congress's enumerated power to spend.267 In that case, if the states
chose not to accept the new Medicaid provisions, then the states would
not be eligible to receive any Medicaid funds at all.268 In holding that
this was not a legitimate exercise of congressional spending power, the
Court emphasized that the new provisions threatened to terminate
existing "significant independent grants. 2 69 Thus, in order to
appropriately exercise congressional spending power, Congress would
have to base the condition on a sum that is a smaller percentage of
funding for foster care, rather than all foster care funding. 270 To
determine a suitable amount of money to implement a spending program
for post-foster care placement religious considerations, Congress could
compare the percentage of the federal funds lost due to noncompliance
with the conditions imposed by the actual amount of the state budget that
consisted of federal funds.271
2. The Federal Government Is More Likely to Place
Responsibility on the States
In developing the Constitution, the Framers designed a government
of dual sovereignty that gave the federal government control over only
national issues, while the states had considerable control over the "lives,
liberties and properties of the people., 272 Throughout time, the role of
264. Id. at210-11.
265. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012).
266. 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012).
267. Id.at 2601.
268. Id.at 2604.
269. Id. at 2603-04.
270. See id. (stating that conditions on the receipt of federal funding are allowed so long as
they do not threaten "significant independent grants"); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207
(1987) (stating that Congress must unambiguously condition the receipt of federal funds).
271. Cf Dole, 483 U.S. at 211. The Supreme Court has held that "[e]very tax is in some
measure regulatory." Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589 (1937). However, the actual
determination is whether choice has become impossible. Id.at 590. Where a state makes a choice of
"her [own] unfettered will," the Court will not find compulsion. Id.
272. THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison). The Framers envisioned federal powers to
encompass control over national issues such as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce,
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the federal government has changed, increasing its involvement in
various issues which were traditionally the province of the states, such as
family law.273 Scholars have recognized that the federal government has
not passed many laws that provide the federal courts with jurisdiction
over family law issues, most specifically in the areas of marriage,
divorce, and child custody.274 Federalism, however, is an important part
of child welfare, foster care, and adoption, as the federal government has
funded state programs in these specific areas.275 In spite of this,
however, there is the general notion that issues revolving around family
law should be left for states to handle.276 The federal government has no
express constitutional authority granting it power to legislate family law
matters; therefore, Congress must either use its express authority to
collect taxes or to expend revenues in order to influence family law in
the states.277 Although Congress can use its express constitutional
authority to influence policy concerning family law in the states, there
has been a reluctance for it to do so. 278 While Congress uses its power
under the Spending Clause to influence family law, it is important that
Congress focuses more on support enforcement and other family law
areas to try to decrease the costs of the federal welfare program.279
Because there is already a congressional concern about the exponential
costs of funding state child welfare programs, it is more likely that
Congress will decline the responsibility of creating another spending
program concerning the foster care system.28 °
Furthermore, Congress must ensure that it does not impermissibly
influence state policy in violation of the Tenth Amendment. 281' The
Supreme Court has held that Congress can only legitimately exercise its
spending power when it is not commandeering the states' legislatures for
federal purposes.2 82 Accordingly, federal law has been held
while state control concerned the ordinary course of affairs of the people and internal order and
prosperity within the state. Id.
273. See Ann Laquer Estin, Sharing Governance: Family Law in Congress and the States, 18
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 267, 331-32 (2009).
274. Id. at 332.
275. See id. at 286-91.
276. See Elizabeth G. Patterson, Unintended Consequences: Why Congress Should Tread
Lightly When Entering the Fieldof Family Law, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 397, 400 (2008).
277. See Ankenbrandt ex rel. L.R. v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 695-97 (1992).
278. See Patterson, supranote 276, at 408.
279. See id. at 408-09.
280. See id. (discussing Congress's efforts to decrease federal spending in the area of family
law).
281. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.").
282. Nat'l Fed'n of lndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012); Printz v. United
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unconstitutional where state actors are compelled to perform federally
mandated actions, such as performing mandatory background checks on
handgun purchasers.28 3 Regarding child welfare programs, an objection
to a federally funded program for religious or nonreligious
considerations can be made if the statute mandated caseworkers to
consider the religious and nonreligious activities of every child in foster
care. 284 The suggested program, however, would not mandate
caseworkers to perform any actions.285 States would have the option of
choosing to participate in the spending program and executing a
regulatory program under the spending guidelines.286 A state's choice to
not participate would be the state's choice to not accept the
federal
28 7
funds, and therefore would not violate constitutional principles.
B. A State Regulatory Program-TheMore PlausibleSolution
As seen by the presence of existing and proposed laws, it is clear
that states have taken, and will most likely be the entities to take, any
further responsibility for implementing regulatory programs to facilitate
religious matching by foster care administrators.28 8 Recent scholarship
has noted that existing studies concerning religious activity in
connection with foster care do not address religious considerations with
foster children after they are in foster care placement. 289 This Note
suggests and prefers a state regulatory program that would require child
welfare agencies to attach an optional questionnaire about religious
practices of the child. 290 The parents would even have the option of
stating that they have no religious practices that they would like to be
observed, in which case the religious conditions in the foster care
household would still be monitored. Caseworkers would be responsible
for informing parents about the option to fill out the form. If the parents
decide that religious or nonreligious practices are not an important factor

States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997).
283. SeePrintz,521 U.S. at 933.
284. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2602-03; Printz, 521 U.S. at 933.
285. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (holding that a state must be able to
knowingly decide whether it so chooses to participate in a federal spending program).
286. See id.
287. See Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. at 2602; Printz, 521 U.S. at 933, 935.
288. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:33 (2002) (allowing for the consideration of religion
in foster care placement); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 373 (McKinney 2010) (suggesting that, when a
child is under the custody of an agency, he should be placed under persons of the same religious
faith where such placement is practicable); Assemb. 4353, 214th Leg. (N.J. 2011) (proposing that a
child's religion is not to be changed when the child enters foster care or when the child is adopted).
289. Corkran, supranote 164, at 329-30.
290. See infra Part V.B.1-2.
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for the child, they can choose not to fill out the form. However, if the
parents do decide to fill out the form, then it will become a part of the
child's case file. The caseworker would then be on notice that the
religious or nonreligious activities of the child while in placement will
be a part of the caseworker's evaluation. The proposed solution would
also require the foster parents to sign an agreement containing the
information about the religious or nonreligious practices, and stating that
they understand and will take reasonable efforts to allow the child to be
able to take part in these practices. That way, the expectations of both
the biological parents and the foster parents will be set from the moment
the child is in placement.2 91 If the foster parents will not allow the child
to participate in the religious activity that the biological parents had
listed, and the birth parents do not agree with the foster parents'
unwillingness to acknowledge the activity, then the caseworker will be
responsible for seeking a new foster placement for the child.
1. Limitations
In order to address religious considerations in foster care, states are
limited in the type of language that they must use in formulating any
procedure to handle religious conflict in post-foster care placement
situations.292 One scholar has proposed three basic tenets that should be
taken into consideration concerning state action regarding religious
considerations in foster care placement.2 93 First, in light of existing case
law, the state should be allowed to resolve the issue of whether a state
agency has accommodated the religious preferences of a foster care child
through the use of the reasonable efforts test. 294 Second, if the child has
the capacity to articulate his own religious identity, then he should be
allowed to do so before the court.2 95 Last, if the child articulates a
religious preference that conflicts with that of the parent, and the court
determines the child has the capacity to understand and reasonably make
that decision, then the preference should be taken seriously. 296 These
three basic considerations are reasonable in light of the importance
that scholars have placed on the child's ability to develop and
291. For an example of a court-generated parental acknowledgement of rights and
responsibilities, see Acknowledgement of Possible Consequences to Parental Rights in Abuse
and Neglect Cases, STATE OF N.H. JUDICIAL BRANCH, http://www.courts.state.nh.us/forms/

nhjb-2209-df.pdf (last updated July 1, 2013).
292. Corkran, supra note 164, at 329 (recognizing that, because of the Supreme Court's
rulings, the Establishment Clause requires states to be neutral between different religions).
293. See id. at 345-46.
294. Id. at 345.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 345-46.
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maintain meaningful relationships with both his biological parents and
his foster parents.297
2. Possible Problems
Permanency hearings, as introduced in this Note, are a way for
foster care agencies to work with the foster family, biological parents or
guardians, and the judicial system to achieve timely and-more
importantly-permanent placement for foster care children.298 The
importance of permanency planning is demonstrated by the federal
government's condition of receipt of federal funding for foster care
programs on the development of case plans for these children.299 It must
be noted, however, that the caseworker's reasonable efforts to promote
reunification of the parents and the child are not required to be evaluated
until eighteen months after the child has been in placement. 00 Because
of this eighteen month time frame, the agency should set its own interim
checkpoints, which may help it discover if or when problems exist with
the child's placement. 30 1 Also, because restructuring foster care
placement criteria to include recognition of religious or nonreligious
preferences of foster care children or their biological parents involves an
obvious consideration of religion, there are objections to the
implementation of a regulatory program that would involve more
paperwork and more attention from both judges and caseworkers.3 2
Furthermore, there is a concern about whose religious preferences the
child welfare agency must acknowledge when the biological parents and
297. See Daniel J. Pilowsky & Wendy G. Kates, Foster Children in Acute Crisis: Assessing
CriticalAspects of Attachment, 35 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 1095, 1096
(1996).
298. See Herring, supra note 70, at 185-87. See supra Part 11.B for a discussion of the types of
procedures that states have in place regarding procedural requirements of permanency planning.
299. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(16) (2006). A case plan is defined as a written document that
includes, among other things, a plan for services for the parents, child and foster parents, health and
education records of the child, and a discussion of the appropriateness of the home or institution in
which the child is placed. Id. § 675(l)(A)-(C) (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
300. Id. § 675(5)(C).
301. See id. § 675(5)(B) (requiring each state to have a case review system by which the status
of each child in foster care is reviewed "no less frequently than once every six months"). Among
other things, this allows for courts to determine the extent of the state agency's compliance with
each child's case plan. Id.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 288-97 for a discussion of the plan proposed by this
Note, requiring parents to complete a questionnaire concerning religious practices they consider
important, and requiring the involvement of caseworkers in keeping abreast of whether these
conditions are being adhered to within the foster home. See also Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
886-87 (1990) ("It is no more appropriate for judges to determine the centrality of religious beliefs
before applying a compelling interest test in the free exercise field, than it would be for them to
determine the importance of ideas before applying the compelling interest test in the free speech
field.").
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children express different desires,0 3 as well as a concern for the
protection of the religious rights of foster parents with different religious
practices if the
state, in its reasonable efforts to find a religious match,
304

cannot do

so.

VI. CONCLUSION
In light of the recent hostility towards Sharia law, which threatens
Muslim children in the foster care system, all foster children need to be
afforded greater protection of their freedom to participate in religious
activities while in foster care placement. 30 5 The recent and growing
hostility towards Sharia law and international law is just one example of
a threat to the ability of parents with deeply rooted religious beliefs, and
intentions to raise their children with those beliefs, to be reunited with
their children after the state becomes involved in the parent-child
relationship through the child welfare system.3 °6 State legislatures have
implemented religious matching statutes, which require child welfare
agencies to provide reasonable efforts to match a child with a family of
the same religion when possible.30 7 These statutes, however, have been
unsuccessful at protecting the religious beliefs that parents have instilled
upon their children before they enter foster care.30 8 Crafting a solution
to protect the religious practices of foster children is a difficult

task, however, in light of many constitutional limitations that must
be recognized.30 9
The Foster Care Improvement Act is a step in the right direction to
affording greater protection to the religious practices that foster children
have learned from their parents.31 ° While this act could foreseeably help
children who have other family members available to care for them
303. Corkran, supra note 164, at 344-46.
304. See id. at 352.
305. See supra Part1.
306. See supra Part1.
307. See Wilder v. Bernstein, 848 F.2d 1338, 1341-42 (2d Cir. 1988) (discussing New York's
religious matching statute). Some states also have constitutional provisions that require religious
matching when a court has jurisdiction over a child. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. VJ, § 32. The New
York State Constitution states:
When any court having jurisdiction over a child shall commit it or remand it to an
institution or agency or place it in the custody of any person by parole, placing out,
adoption or guardianship, the child shall be committed or remanded or placed, when
practicable, in an institution or agency governed by persons, or in the custody of a
person, of the same religious persuasion as the child.
Id.
308. See Assaf, supra note 1.
309. See discussion supra Part HI.C.
310. See discussion supra notes 236-52 and accompanying text.
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when they are placed in a child welfare system, it will not be beneficial
to those without extended family available to take custody of them when
the need arises.3 1' Ultimately, a state regulatory program involving more
communication between caseworkers, foster parents, and biological
parents, as well as an observation of constitutional limitations on the
states' involvement in religious matters, would be the most appropriate
solution for addressing the needs of foster care children after they have
been afforded placement.3 12
Cherie Nicole Brown*

311. See Rehab and Ahmed Amer Foster Care Improvement Act of 2012, H.R. 6021, 112th
Cong.; discussion supra notes 236-52 and accompanying text.
312. See supra Part V.B.
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